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LETTER TO THE EDITOR
Reply to ‘‘Is Mathematical Logic a Part of Mathematics?’’
When Greg Moore first objected to my views about the tenuous connection
between mathematical logic and mathematics he e-mailed me and Wilfrid Hodges.
He offered his final opinion in a letter in Historia Mathematics 24 (1997), 210–212,
and it is to that that I wish to reply.
Lovers of academic storms in teacups will be disappointed to hear that I wish to
plea bargain. The position I now hold is that the relation between mathematical logic
and mathematics became tenuous, but that it has become stronger. Interestingly, it
has done so in what might be called bread-and-butter ways, i.e., by contributing to
proofs within mathematics, and not by developing the foundational aspects that
were so prominent in the 1930s. The examples of this thesis that Hodges kindly
supplied me are convincing enough on the former point. These were Mal’tsev’s use
of the compactness theorem in 1941 to prove a result about linear groups; the
Ax–Kochen–Ershov theorem (1965) and Denef ’s solution to a question of Serre
and Osterle´ (1964), both concerning the p-adic numbers; the Robinson–Roquette
proof in 1974 of Siegel’s theorem of 1929; an unpublished proof by Hrushovski and
Chatzidakis of the so-called Manin–Mumford conjecture; and a similarly model-
theoretic proof by Hrushovski of the Mordell–Lang conjecture in the function field
case. Hodges argues that one can regard algebraic geometry as a special case of
model theory. I find this evidence, to which I can add recent work of Alex Wilkie,
persuasive. In another area, differential equations, work of Singer and others has
shown that questions about constructive fields are important when looking for
algorithms for solving linear equations. I find this evidence more persuasive than
the examples Moore adduces, for reasons which are interesting.
The historical story Moore tells on the first page of his letter does nothing to
dent my feeling that there is a tradition of mathematical logic that is deep and
narrow. There is nothing wrong with that, by the way; the same can be said of
much excellent mathematics. The second page hints at some of the evidence Hodges
also presents. What conclusions does this suggest? Algebraic geometry convinces
me that there is a bread-and-butter connection in the above sense, but the theorem
of Shelah that Moore quotes does not. Why? The latter theorem says that two
mathematical objects have a property of interest to a mathematical logician if and
only if they have a property belonging to a concept claimed by topologists and
logicians. Similarly, Moore offers a paragraph on forcing, which as he presents it
remains within mathematical logic, and a paragraph on Tarski’s work on real closed
fields as used in Jacobson’s Basic Algebra.
Perhaps I have a sense of what is mathematics and what is mathematical logic
which is closer to Hodges’s than Moore’s. The connections Moore traces in his
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letter are better than tenuous, but not as strong as the situation on the ground
warrants, perhaps because Moore seems to see mathematical logic as in any case
closer to mathematics than I do. Indeed, he speaks of some mathematicians having
a prejudice against mathematical logic, as if a decision not to have a logician in a
mathematics department could not simply be a reasonable view, or have been a
reasonable view at some stage.
What decides whether a topic belongs with another one or not is a very compli-
cated matter, and one that historians of mathematics should be very interested in.
Our training as historians equips us best to look at the past, where there is documen-
tary evidence. It does not equip us so well to look at the recent period. In my
review I commented at length on the way that the essay under review discussed
mathematical logic, saying that it was ‘‘innocently reinforcing our view (if we are
not logicians) of its remoteness.’’ I tried to suggest that there was a failure to argue
for the significance of the work in that area. Now I concede that it is not just
logicians who do not see the work as remote. But still it seems worth observing
that there are tensions between mathematics and mathematical logic. Things are
changing, along the lines that Hodges has argued, but even he admits that model
theory has shown great resistance to being absorbed into the techniques of geometry.
This is interesting in a number of ways. One is that the technicalities have become
very rich and sophisticated, to the point where they can deliver real insights into
other domains (analogous to the change that happened when topological proofs of
theorems came in). Another is that perhaps the technical machinery has survived
more effectively than the philosophical aura around it (which Go¨del dissipated).
Indeed, I would claim that work on such matters as Martin’s axiom, and axioms
that are or are not equivalent to the axiom of choice, is seen by many mathematicians
as only tenuously related to their subject. But to make such a claim is to leave the
realm of the history of mathematics for that of its current affairs. Who of us can
actually say? What would a list of eminent axiom traders at leading universities
establish? Only, I submit, that none of us can speak with confidence about the
present. But still, one can ask, and so I shall. Am I right in thinking that indeed
Go¨del put an end to Hilbert’s hopes and with it the interest of most mathematicians
in philosophy of mathematics? This would have implications for the present practice
of philosophy of mathematics, which many people do think is remote from present-
day mathematics. Am I right in thinking that at some date to be determined, but
perhaps in the 1950s (look at the dates in Hodges’s list), mathematical logic made
connections with mathematics in substantial if technical ways? If so, and that is
what experts like Hodges tell us eloquently, then how did this come about, and did
the apparent equation of mathematical logic with proof theory divert our gaze?
I regret that Moore chose to end his letter with one of those rhetorical flourishes
we all love. The paragraph from which my erroneous claim is drawn raises issues
for the historian of mathematics and is open to the possibility that my perceptions
may stand in need of correction. If I dismissed the developments of the past 30
years it was not a little because the essay under review stops around 1950. If relations
have never been stronger than in the past 30 years, that does nothing to establish
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that relations were other than tenuous in the 1950s. If Moore is right, we must all
hope he will write us a history of these developments at length, in which the
claims for the significance of mathematical logic are cogently argued. To such an
achievement I shall not wave my hand, but doff my hat.
Jeremy Gray
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Open University
Milton Keynes MK7 6AA
England
